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Editorial

Jet Airways: Jet, Set, Gone? Or Can it Succeed?

Jet Airways is back in the news, this time with some positivity. A group of investors, Murari Lal Jalan (stay tuned for his bio), and UK-based financial services company Kalrock Capital have won the bid to buy Jet Airways in a vote by the CoC or Consortium of Creditors. The CoC consists of all the creditors to whom Jet Airways owes money. The duo would have to invest close to Rs 1,000 crores to get the operations up and running in its initial stage. However, the company won’t be operational before next year. Let’s take a peek into what caused Jet to shut down in the first place.

Jet Airways halted its international as well as domestic operations on April 17, 2019. It was once a symbol of luxury, customer loyalty, and service par excellence. Moreover, Air India was its only competitor for a long time in the ‘90s. Later, Jet was faced with debts, competition by low-cost carriers, tax evasion notices, poor top management, and money mismanagement allegations. Jet Airways was on the verge of closure in the past but got back on its feet when Etihad bought a 24% stake in 2013 for more than Rs 2,100 crores. Despite this, the airline fell into deeper losses.Let’s dig into what caused Jet Airways to shut shop.

Why Jet Airways failed

Irrational Spending

Experts believe that Jet Airways’ account of irrational spending dates back to 2006 when it purchased Air Sahara, the low-cost carrier for $500 Million in cash. This acquisition was considered over-valued by most market watchers considering Air Sahara’s budget business model and fleet size as compared to Jet Airways’ full-service model.

Jet Airways dominated the industry after the acquisition of Air Sahara, but the acquisition came with its own set of problems. These were mostly about due diligence, legalities, regulatory matters, compensation, human resource issues, leadership, and integration strategies.

Competition

Jet Airways needed a MASSIVE restructuring in its company. It was a full-service airline venturing into low-cost flying. However, by the time it could restructure, market players like Spicejet, Indigo, and Go-Air had started a fiercely competitive price war. Their aircrafts and engines were brand-new and fuel-efficient. They adopted a budget-friendly strategy.

Fun Fact: Indigo and GoAir employ only female cabin crew since on average they are 15-20 kg lighter than their male counterparts. This helps them save close to Rs 30 crores every year in terms of fuel cost. Every extra-kilogram on the flight costs airlines Rs 5 per flight hour.

It was getting difficult for Jet Airways in this fiercely competitive market where flying wasn’t just a luxury anymore, it was a necessity.

Poor Management

Both Jet Airways and Jet Lite (later Jet Konnect)  had a single team headed by Naresh Goyal, the founder and chairman. It was this one team; that was handling both the full-service carrier as well as the budget carrier, Jet Konnect. The operation of a budget carrier and a full-service airline is different. Jet Airways used the same tool or mechanism to run both. When Jet Konnect merged with Jet Airways after a financial crisis, Jet Airways continued to hold two operating licenses while technically operating a single airline. This added to cost and caused some operational problems.

The Tatas had offered to buy a stake(undisclosed) in Jet Airways in 2018, chairman Naresh Goyal refused to dilute his share of stake for Tata. Shortly after this, two of Jet’s independent directors, two independent directors – Vikram Mehta Singh and Ranjan Mathai – resigned in November 2018, the same month the Tatas were in talks with the board. The promoters and chairman put their interests before the minority stakeholders’ interest. The cash flow and debt management of Jet Airways were pretty mediocre in popular opinion.

The fluctuation of Oil Prices

Oil prices have been all over the place in the past few years. Crude oil prices affect the ATF(Aviation Turbine Fuel) prices. Moreover, ATF is much more expensive in India than around the world. India continues to be a major importer of oil. The rising crude oil prices coupled with the depreciating rupee is a burden for many airlines.

The Scavenging Effect

After Jet ceased operations, the entire aviation industry benefited from it. Other airlines captured Jet Airways’ market share by leasing their aircraft, obtaining their airport slots, hiring the laid off staff of Jet Airways and capturing the lost customer base . 

Airfares increased shortly after Jet Airways ceased operations. Spicejet and Vistara leased Jet’s aircraft. IndiGo acquired more slots from Mumbai’s Terminal 2 and Delhi’s Terminal 3. Many airlines acquired Jet Airways’ aircraft, terminal slots, and routes. Spicejet absorbed much of Jet’s staff and its older aircraft variant, the B737 NG. It even added a premium ‘Business Class’ to its fleet. 

Vistara managed to expand its focus from Mumbai and Delhi. It obtained slots of Mumbai – Bangalore, Mumbai – Chennai, Mumbai – Hyderabad, and other such routes establishing Pan-India operations. All the airlines at a major scale absorbed much of Jet’s assets, routes, and employees.

How Much More?

  • There is a lot of work to be done before the first flight takes off like charting out a plan for the new fleet that the airline will have, deciding on key positions of the company, figuring out the routes, and other paperwork involved.
  • Jet Airways owes a lot of money to investors and banks, roughly close to Rs 14,000 croresCrores. However, Jet doesn’t have much liquidity to offer to the creditors. The sale of assets won’t fetch the creditors much money. Some of the debt will be converted to equity which might bring relief to some creditors. As far as debt is concerned Jet is indeed in a puddle. Bank stocks went up as well, after the revival of Jet Airways was announced.
  • There is a lot of work to be done before the first flight takes off like charting out a plan for the new fleet that the airline will have, deciding on key positions of the company, figuring out the routes, and other paperwork involved.
  • Jet Airways before it opens up will have to be firm on the following aspects:
    1. What routes is Jet Airways going to fly?. International operations might be tricky given the COVID-19 situation
    2. How many airport slots will it be able to get back? It will have to use
    3. What will be its fleet like? Currently, it owns only 6 old fleets.
    4. How does it intend to cover the debt that it owes?
    5. Who is going to be the CEO? Murari Lal Jalan hasn’t operated an airline before and Kalrock is a financial services firm.
    6. A plan on how and when Jet Airways will hit break-even and turn a profitable airline where even established players are struggling.
    7. A strategy to recapture its brand value. A rebranding could be a possibility.
  • Finally, on a positive note for Jet Airways, it might be easier than it seems to revive it. COVID-19 has pushed many airlines to vacate airport slots. The aircraft lessors have reduced their prices, therefore Jet Airways can get the fleet for cheap. The fuel costs for aircraft too have gone down considering reduced demand. Jet Airways has been operational for close to 3 decades, which gives it a name and repute in the market. Considering that there are not many full service carriers in India and not many airlines that offer wider international connectivity, Jet Airways seemingly can fill the void.
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Editorial

Equitas SFB IPO. All You Need To Know

Equitas Small Finance Bank has launched its IPO The period for subscription began on 20th October and shall end on 22nd October 2020. The scrip will be listed on 2nd November 2020. The current offer for sale is of 7.2 crore equity shares amounting to Rs 237.60 crores and a fresh issue of equity shares aggregating to Rs 237 crores. Offer for sale amount goes to the promoters, as it is their exit. Fresh equity goes into funding for the company. The company aims to raise close to Rs 517 crores through the IPO. Let’s find out more about this IPO.

About the IPO

Issue OpenOct 20, 2020
Issue CloseOct 22, 2020
IPO PriceRs 32 – Rs 33
Lot Size450 Shares
Minimum Order Quantity450 Shares or 1 lot 
Face ValueRs.10
IPO SizeRs 517.60 crore
Fresh IssueEquity Shares of Rs 10 amounting to Rs 280 crores
Listed onBoth NSE & BSE

On Day 1, the IPO was subscribed by 39%. It received bids for 4,54,01,850 shares against a total issue size of 11,58,50,001 shares according to NSE data.

On Day 2, the IPO was subscribed by 50%. Receiving bids for 5,80,78,800 shares according to NSE data. 

Overall, the IPO has been subscribed 0.67 times as of Day 2.

CategorySubscription Status
Qualified Institutional Buyers(QIB)0.05 Times
Non-Institutional Investors(NII)0.05 Times
Retail(RIIs) 1.42 Times
Employee0.97 Times
Others0.24 Times
Total0.67 Times
QIB subscription looks low

Investors who have shares of Equitas Holdings (EHL) which is the parent company of Equitas Small Finance Bank are eligible to apply under the shareholder’s category of Equitas Small Finance Bank IPO. The company has reserved 10% of the offer for Shareholders of EHL amounting close to Rs 51 crores.

About the Company

  • The Equitas Small Finance Bank is an institution founded in 2007 that provides retail baking services and other financial services. The aim of a small finance bank is financial inclusion of areas like small businesses, marginal farmers, micro-industries, and unorganized sector entities. Small Finance Banks with net worth above Rs 500 crore are supposed to mandatorily get listed on the stock exchanges within 3 years, and this is why Equitas SFB is doing its IPO.
  • Equitas SFB is the largest small finance bank in terms of outlets and the second-largest in terms of assets under management and deposits according to CRISIL.  
  • The company possesses the following strengths:
    • Largest Small Finance Bank in terms of outlets(856 banking outlets and 322 ATMs), therefore better market distribution network in terms of micro-financing services.
    • Customized Credit Assessment before giving out loans, this ensures low NPAs. The Gross NPA for the company was 2.68% of total advances or total money lent out. 
    • The bank has a well-diversified asset portfolio which includes Vehicle Finance, Agriculture Finance, Micro Finance, Housing Finance, MSE Finance, and Corporates. The Secured-Loan product segment has grown at a CAGR of 48.35% over the last two years.
    • The company is technology-driven and has invested close to ~65 Crores in Q1FY21, on technology initiatives.
    • Experienced leadership and trained employee base.
  • There are certain risk factors involved with the company such as :
    • COVID-19 pandemic. May lead to reduced collections, reduced disbursements and deposits, and increased provisioning for loans. There may be a significant increase in our NPA levels.
    • The bank is subject to stringent regulatory requirements of RBI and other regulatory authorities. Failing to comply with them might make an impact on the business. SFBs or Micro Financing is a relatively new concept in India as compared to traditional banking. The company provides small business loans, microfinance, and vehicle finance loans are under-served segments in India. The health of the business depends on the ability of first-time borrowers to pay back in time.
    • The majority of the bank’s advances are in Tamil Nadu, any adverse changes that might affect the region can give an impact on the business.
    • Subject to Interest Rate Risk. Any volatility in interest rates or inability to manage interest rate risk could highly affect the bank.
    • Equitas SFB was earlier an NBFC and used to fund itself using term loans from big banks and financial institutions. Now the company depends on deposits and refinancing to fund itself. SFBs are restricted by RBI guidelines to perform certain functions related to funding. The inability to fund itself might be a problem for the bank. 

The company’s vital financials are as follows:

30 June ’2031 March ’2031 March ’1931 March ’18
Total Assets20,892.1419,314.5515,762.6913,301.15
Total Income750.972927.802394.831772.90
Total Expenses693.302684.162184.271741.07
Profit After Tax57.67243.64210.5731.83
Amount in Rs. Crores

The concept of Micro Finance is still relatively new in India. RBI guidelines on SFB creates certain bottlenecks in their operations. However, these banks to reduce risk have created a stringent credit assessment procedure to avoid a high number of NPAs. It is advised that an investor thoroughly goes through the company’s strategy regarding funding, credit facilities, expansion of business, and other important vital ratios. Such vital information can be found in the company’s RHP or Red Herring Prospectus. You can check out the Red Herring Prospectus of the company over here.

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Editorial

Can Tata Group be the King of Indian Retail?

The retail sector in our country is filled with a lot of companies that compete with each other to reach the top. And at a time when global players like Amazon and Walmart are competing for customers in India, it is no surprise that India’s biggest business houses would want to get into the scene too. 

During the Covid-19 lockdown, companies such as Reliance Retail, Amazon, and Walmart were preparing for the retail war ahead. The retail segment in India is anyway growing with the increasing population of the country. But what these huge companies want is a piece of the organized retail market in India, which is exploding as more and more young citizens are getting high paying jobs. More specifically, it is a race of giants to become the king of India’s booming e-commerce space.

Interestingly, there are reports flying around, about Tata Group’s plans to expand their online retail presence. Let us understand how Tata is preparing to up its game in this space, and find out if it is too little too late.

  1. Race to the Top
  2. The Super App
  3. Tata to acquire BigBasket?
  4. Tata Consumer Products expanding
  5. Will these plans be enough?

Race to the Top

Based on a report from the Indian Business Equity Foundation (IBEF), the retail industry in India is expected to reach Rs 76.87 lakh crore (USD 1.1 trillion) by 2020. We have seen that the Covid-19 pandemic had a devastating impact on the organized retail sector. However, the situation is projected to get better, as lockdown restrictions have now been lifted. Amazon.in, Reliance Industries, and Walmart have all shown how this particular sector is going to become a battleground in the months to come. 

Over the last few months, we keep hearing about the expansion of Mukesh Ambani’s Reliance Industries Limited (RIL) in the retail sector. Reliance Retail Ventures Limited (RRVL) has raised Rs 37,440 crore this year from private equity firms. Currently, it is the largest retail company in India. All these highly competitive factors could make it difficult for a company like Tata to expand and develop in this particular market. However, over the past few months, we have heard reports stating that Tata Group is not going to back down without a fight. They have come up with solutions to bring about more competition in the organized retail space. Let us look at a few of these:

The Super App

In August, Tata Group stated that it had plans to launch a ‘Super App’ to take on Reliance and Amazon. The app would be a one-stop destination for all of Tata’s products. We hope you can imagine the magnitude of this product. Tata Group sells salt to jewellery and everything in between, including cars and even trucks. Imagine using the Super App could be used by you to order a Fastrack watch, or maybe even to book a Tata Harrier SUV.

It is expected that the Super App will also merge services from food and grocery ordering to fashion, electronics, insurance, healthcare, and bill payments. Currently, the services can be found in Tata CLiQ and Croma for electronics, StarQuick for groceries, and streaming services in Tata Sky. The app is also set to have its own payment system, and the loss-making Tata Teleservices is said to be the one that could provide technical support and enterprise solutions.

The concept of a Super App can be seen from applications such as PayTM and PhonePe. When these apps started in India, they were just payment platforms. However, this model has seen massive growth in terms of the services that they provide, and the customers seem to be giving positive feedback for this new model.

Another report came up in September, stating that retail giant Walmart Inc, (who owns Flipkart and PhonePe) was in talks with Tata Group for a potential investment in the super app for up to $25 billion (~Rs 1.8 lakh crore). The app is likely to be launched between December and January, as a joint venture between the two companies.

Tata to acquire BigBasket?

On 15th October, reports were sent out by major publications stating that Tata Group was in talks to acquire BigBasket. The Bengaluru-based company is one of the best online grocery stores in India. The company delivers groceries in about 26 major cities and towns. As the Covid-19 pandemic hit our country and people were stuck at home, the demand for these online services has seen an all-time high. The company is backed by China’s Alibaba Group, and has reported a valuation of nearly $1.2 billion (~Rs 8,809 crore) as of March. Last month, BigBasket said that the number of new users on its platform had increased by 84%, as compared with the pre-Covid levels. On 25th May, BigBasket had appointed financial services companies Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to help raise funds, and are now looking to increase their valuation to $2 billion (~Rs 14,682 crore). A business valuation is a process of determining the total economic value of a whole business or a company, and raising the valuation would help them sell stake, and raise more funds.

Another report which has come up in the past few weeks is that Tata Group has also made plans to acquire IndiaMart InterMesh Ltd, a business-to-business (B2B) marketplace. It is an e-commerce company that sells to normal consumers and to other small businesses. Basically, the company helps Indian manufacturers to connect with buyers. IndiaMart’s shares have surged almost 142% this year, giving it a market value of about Rs 14,682 crore. According to their website, IndiaMart says it controls almost 60% of the Indian online B2B market, providing a platform for small and medium enterprises. The point to be noted is that Flipkart and Amazon have been expanding their B2B presence as well. You can read about it here. Through this acquisition, the Tata Group would be able to obtain a major hold of the online e-commerce retail market in India.

Tata Consumer Products

The new CEO of Tata Consumer Products Limited (TATACONSUM), Sunil D’Souza, has announced plans to transform the company as the new face of Tata Group’s fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG) company. TATACONSUM had been formed recently through the merger of Tata Global Beverages and Tata Chemicals.

TATACONSUM is also planning to contribute to Tata Group’s ultimate goal to strengthen its retail presence. Currently, the firm’s products include Tata Tea, Tetley, and Tata Salt, and also has a joint venture with Starbucks Corporation in India. In September, they made a non-binding bid for the vending machine business of Coffee Day Enterprises Ltd. Coffee Day is one of the largest coffee chains in India, and has over 60,000 vending machines across malls, public spaces, and schools in India. This could help TATACONSUM obtain more access to the premium coffee platform in India, along with the help of Starbucks.

The company has also declared plans to bring about changes to its entire sales and distribution system. In order to double its reach to customers, they are creating a more direct, active, and digitized system. During the beginning of the financial year, Tata Consumer Products also bought out partner PepsiCo’s stake in NourishCo Beverages Limited, whose products include Himalayan mineral water. This has been seen as an aggressive move by the company. We can see that this trend of acquisitions would largely have a positive impact on the growth of the company.

We see that the shares of Tata Consumer have so far increased 52% this year, thus giving them a market value of about Rs 44,046 crore.

Will these plans be enough?

Through a series of acquisitions, expansion of Tata Consumer Products, and through investments in its new Super App, the Tata Group will be able to compete against India’s retail giants. But, a question arises here-  Is the Tata Group too late to improve on its retail presence? Except for a few companies like Tata Consultancy Services, most of the other subsidiary companies of Tata Group are making huge losses. If the integration of all these new expansion plans is precisely calculated and achieved, the retail business of the Tata Group of Companies will be able to bring in better returns. In order to make a mark on the organized retail sector in India, companies would have to go all out and play the best strategies. 

All eyes are focused on how the Tata Group is planning to execute these huge plans. Will the Super App be as great as it sounds? Let us wait and watch for the results.

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Editorial Editorial of the Day

Theatres opening : Are the gloomy days for PVR and Inox behind?

When we talk about industries suffering from COVID-19 pandemic, the airline industry and tourism industry hits our minds. We often forget how catastrophic this pandemic has been to the cinema chains. The central government of India announced a lockdown in March. Since then, theatres around the country have been forced to stay shut. According to an estimate, film exhibitors have already lost revenue of around Rs 9,000 crores.

After nearly 7 months of closure, the government of India has given a green light to open the theatres from October 15. This comes during a time when India is reporting more than 60,000 positive cases daily. Even though the central government has given its nod, state governments will take the final decision. Maharashtra, Kerala, Telangana, Tamil Nadu and few other states are yet to allow the cinema halls and multiplexes to reopen.

  1. Not Fully Opened
  2. The Fall in Numbers
  3. Where is the Content?
  4. Will people come back?
  5. The way forward

Not Fully Opened

The cinemas are allowed to open but several guidelines force them to operate within a very limited space. The Ministry of Information and Broadcasting (I&B) released Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) which the cinema halls and multiplexes are obliged to follow. The most adverse restriction is on the capacity of people to be allowed to enter. All the halls are ordered to run at a capacity of not more than 50%. How will this impact their business? In one of our articles earlier, we explained to you how the Indian airlines realize its profits by getting more passengers on board. Higher the passengers they have in one flight, more profit they can derive due to lower variable cost. You can read the article here.

Similarly, what cinema halls offer is one screen to all the viewers. No matter, if there are 100 attendees or 10 attendees, screen, ACs and projector, will incur the same cost. Thus, the cost will remain on the same level but revenue will fall. It will further decrease the profit which they can realize.

Apart from this, due to the pandemic situation, cinema halls and multiplexes have to ensure that regular sanitizing of auditorium takes place. Every alternate seat will be marked with a tab or floor fluorescent so that no one occupies those seats. Thermal screening at the time of entry and touchless transaction during any time inside the halls will only increase the expenses.

The Fall in Numbers

“Never in our history of 21 long years have cinemas closed down fully. Like any other business, we have gone through ups and downs in terms of revenues but we had never imagined our revenue will read zero.” – Gautam Dutta, CEO of PVR Cinemas.

PVR Cinemas is the largest cinema chain in India. It has 845 screens which offer 182 thousand seats all over the nation. But due to the lockdown, all the cinema halls were shut. This led to zero revenue from its core business, that is income from the sale of movie tickets. Income from Food & Beverages were also a very high margin business for these cinema halls.

People were aware of how PVR’s Q1 FY21 results will look like. But, it hits you only when you really see it. Below is the snapshot of their performance in the quarter hit by COVID-19. EBITDA, EBIT, PBT, PAT and EPS, all the financial metrics were in negatives. As Gautam Dutta said, this was one scenario, they could have never imagined. The only income they were able to derive included interest income, gain on redemption of MF/investments, convenience fee and other non-operating income.

                     [Source: Annual Report] (PVR – Results Summary – Q1 FY21: Loss – Rs 141.07 crore)

The only good thing to see in their results was the lower expenses. That is understandable, right? Lower electricity and water bills, no rent and lesser payment to maintain common areas helped the company to reduce its expenses by almost 80%.

If you think, only PVR faced these humongous losses then let’s look at INOX. INOX Leisure Limited is one of India’s largest multiplex chains in the country. Here a snapshot of their Q1 FY21 results.

                                  [Source: Annual Report]  (INOX Leisure Limited – Results Summary – Q1FY21)

Again, the revenue generated from the sale of movie tickets was zero. This was the impact on all the cinema chains all over the nation from the past 7 months.

Where is the Content?

Cinema halls are allowed to open but what will they show? All the new movies which have released in recent months have been forced to launch on online streaming websites like Hotstar, Netflix and Amazon. The movies which were near to complete their shoot are witnessing delay in film completion. This will further delay their launch dates. 

To begin with, cinema chains are planning to bring old classics at cheaper ticket prices. This phase one will be used to attract footfalls by tapping on the emotional quotient of the customers. In remembrance of late actors Rishi Kapoor or Irrfan Khan, people will be invited to watch their older films at a cheaper price.

The management of cinema chains is optimistic that this can trigger the customers to leave their houses and visit halls slowly. They are ready to offer low prices until new content comes on the screens. Once the new movies are launched, prices are expected to go back to pre-covid levels. Big movies of 2020 like Laxmmi Bomb, Sooryavanshi, ’83’ are yet to be launched. Once these movies are ready with a date, people are expected to walk back to the theatres.

Will people come back?

One issue is content, another issue is the desire of customers. Two obstacles in cinema chains’ way to attract customers are 1) Online Streaming Websites 2) Safety concerns.

If the theatre halls are showing old content until new movies are released, why would a person want to leave the comfort of his/her sofa and pay money to watch the same content in the halls? Cinema chains vs digital platforms have always been a topic of debate. But these COVID times have made the latter highly popular. 

People have already taken subscriptions of different digital platforms. Going to theatres will only increase their luxury expenses. Indian audiences do like to visit the theatres but digital platforms have given them a lot of benefits. Wide arrays of options of movies/ TV shows to watch is just one of them. Also, they can easily skip a scene and jump ahead or go back and revisit the scene they loved. Theatres don’t offer this facility.

Cinemas survived the era of DVDs. Many speculated that the arrival of DVDs could end the theatre’s existence. But, that didn’t happen. Instead, cinema chains thrived in recent years. What fight these classic cinema halls bring against digital platforms will be seen in the next few months.

Today, people are moving out of their houses only for compulsory purposes. Will they trust the halls and multiplexes to ensure their safety in these vulnerable times? PVR and INOX are targeting to build customer confidence with an ‘Evangelism’ phase. Here, evangelism means to let the people experience its enhanced safety features first-hand. They believe that if they offer security, then the customers who have visited them can go out and talk about all the good measures taken by them.

The Way Forward

The initial 6 weeks will be very challenging for the film exhibitors. The month of November and December might see one or two big movie releases. Before that, it will be interesting to see if the cinema chains can lure back their customers. PVR has already stated that they are opening only 50%-60% of its total screens. They have also kept two teams on standby in every city. In case there is an issue with any of the employees (eg:if anyone gets diagnosed with Covid), the whole team working at that centre will be replaced.

Another issue which the business will face in the third quarter is rent payments. After two-quarters of zero revenue, it is obvious that the companies will have less cash with them. On top of that, they have to pay rent or common area maintenance (CAM) fee after the re-opening.

Multiplex companies are urging the mall owners to grant full rent waiver but that seems unlikely. Running a mall is very costly. A multiplex cinema normally takes more than one-tenth of the total area. If the full rent waiver is granted, malls will find it very difficult to run its fixed cost. Thus, until the business recovers for the cinema chains, a revenue-sharing approach is most suitable for the multiplex. This will help both the parties to bear losses equally rather than one taking the bullet for the other. 

Due to the pandemic, small movie theatres in cities would have maybe closed due to lack of funds. It is a sad reality that this will help the big media houses like PVR and Inox get better margins and maybe survive these tough times.

To sum up, the short-term future of cinema chains is looking very bleak. If social distancing norms are not followed, a chance for COVID-19 outbreak will increase. Currently, cinema chains should aim to get used to these protocols. They should hope for better Q3 performance and aim to gather momentum before they step in Q4. Indeed, it is a very difficult time for the sector. It will be interesting to see how they fight this dual battle against COVID-19 and the popularity of the digital platforms.

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The Delisting Failure of Vedanta Ltd

Vedanta Limited is one of the leading mining companies based in India. It operates iron ore, gold, and aluminum mines in the states of Goa, Rajasthan, and Odisha. As you may have noticed, the company has been all over the news since May. They had announced plans of delisting its shares. But now, after almost 5 months, its delisting offer has failed. Let us understand what the process of delisting is, and why Vedanta Ltd may be investigated by the regulators on this matter. 

Index

  1. What is Delisting?
  2. Why did Vedanta decide to Delist?
  3. How does a company delist?
  4. What happened after the failure?

What is Delisting?

In simple terms, delisting refers to the permanent removal of a company’s shares from the stock exchange platform. When a company goes public, its shares get listed on the stock exchanges. Retail investors like you and I are able to buy or sell these shares. At some point in time, the company may decide to become private again. Generally, this decision is made when the company has plans to expand and restructure, or if the promoters want to raise their stake in the company. This is one type of delisting which can be categorized as voluntary delisting. Thus, they will have to delist its shares from the stock exchanges. The company’s shares will no longer be traded in the NSE or the BSE. 

The second type of delisting is involuntary delisting (or compulsory delisting). This happens when a company does not follow the rules set by the regulatory authorities such as SEBI. For example, when a company does not pay the annual listing fees to the stock exchanges, it can get delisted as a form of punishment. Involuntary delisting can also happen if a company is completely unable to pay its outstanding debts, ie, when it goes bankrupt.

In this particular case of Vedanta Ltd, the company has decided (by itself) to delist its shares from being traded in the stock exchanges.

Why did Vedanta decide to Delist?

Now, you may wonder why a company listed on the stock exchanges decides to just remove its shares from being traded. In the case of Vedanta Ltd, the share price had been around Rs 130-140 per share at the beginning of the year. In May 2020, the promoter group of Vedanta Ltd held 50.14% in the firm. Around the same time, stock prices had been trading at very low levels, as the Covid-19 pandemic had affected their production activities. The promoters decided that it was time to buy out the rest of the company. They have stated that “corporate simplification” is the main motive for delisting. Corporate simplification means that the company is planning to change its overall structure into a more efficient and organized system, which would help them to reduce costs. Experts say that this move would bring improvements to the operational and financial flexibility for this capital-intensive business. The mining industry always requires large amounts of investment to produce goods and needs a high level of plant and machinery.

It has also been reported that its parent company, Vedanta Resources, has a high debt of $ 6.7 billion (~Rs 49,186 crore), out of which $1.4 (~ Rs 10,277 crore) billion is due to be paid in the current financial year.

How does a company delist?

  1. Firstly, a Board Meeting of the promoters and directors of the company would be held, to decide whether to delist its shares or not. 
  2. If they agree to go ahead, the company informs the stock exchanges about their decision. Then, the floor price is calculated. The floor price is the minimum price at which the promoters are willing to buy shares from the public shareholders. 
  3. Once the floor price has been set, they seek approval from the shareholders. This is a very important step, as a special resolution has to be passed by the shareholders.
  4. The Board of Directors then appoints a merchant banker, who is in charge of seeking approval from the stock exchange.
  5. The promoters advertise the offer, and sends a letter detailing the floor price to all the public shareholders.
  6. If there is a majority approval by the shareholders, the Reverse Book-Building (RBB) process will be initiated. In this process, the shareholders of the company quote a price (or make bids) at which they are willing to sell their shares. Shareholders will be able to do this through an online bidding system on the stock exchanges, which will be open for a total of 5 days. A final price (also known as the discovered price) is announced on the last day of the reverse book building after all the bids have been taken into consideration.
  7. Delisting will be successful, only if the promoters buy out these shares from the shareholders, and reaches a 90% ownership in the company. Thus, the company can become private again.
  8. The company will make a final payment to the shareholders.

In normal circumstances, if the shareholders and the Board of Directors agreed on the discovered price, the delisting process would take a minimum of 8-10 weeks (from the date of announcement of shareholder approval).

On the 18th of May, the Board of Directors of Vedanta Ltd held a meeting to decide whether Vedanta Ltd should be delisted or not. They had proposed a floor price of Rs 87.25 per share. This was a 9.9% premium over the closing market price of Rs 79.6, as of 11th May 2020. This was not the final offer price for the delisting. The final offer price is determined by the merchant banker, who was appointed to carry out the Reverse book building process. In June, 93% of all shareholders and 84.3% of public shareholders had given their approval to delist the shares of Vedanta Ltd. The RBB process began on October 5th and concluded on October 9th. 

Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), which held 6.37% in Vedanta, offered to sell all its shares at Rs 320 per share, which was a 267% premium over the floor price of Rs 87.5. What this meant was that, if the delisting was successful, promoters would have to delist the shares at Rs 320 per share. This development was obviously not good for the promoters, as they would have to purchase the shares at such a large amount of money. As reported by major publications, shareholders could bid at an average price of anywhere between Rs 140-300 per share.

What happened after the failure?

On 10th October, Vedanta Ltd became the third company in the past two years to have an unsuccessful delisting, after INEOS Styrolution and Linde India. In a regulatory filing to the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), the company stated the following: Out of the 134.1 crore shares that were required to successfully delist, only 125.47 crore bids were confirmed. This means that 12.31 crore shares were not confirmed. As 90% ownership had not been secured by the promoters, the delisting offer had failed. After this announcement broke out, shares of Vedanta saw a fall of 20.43% to Rs 96.95 on 12th October.

Now, the company has to release all the shares that had been tendered (offered) by the shareholders within 10 days, and promoters cannot acquire any of these shares. However, the promoters can make a counter-offer within two working days. A counter-offer is a fresh offer that is usually made when the discovered price is not accepted. As per SEBI delisting rules, the counter offer price cannot be less than the book value of the company. It should be noted that the management has not made any announcements of a counter offer within 2 days of the delisting failure.

The main reason for the failure of the delisting process of Vedanta Ltd is not clear. Reports have stated that a technical glitch in the bidding process could have caused a wrong result. On October 9th, the bidding process was supposed to close at the end of market hours, but the shareholders were facing certain technical problems. The Bombay Stock Exchange allowed the bidding to continue till 7 PM. At a given point, it had been reported that the 90% level had crossed. However, at around 7:35 PM, the BSE website showed that only 125.47 crore shares were confirmed. Other experts have questioned the fact as to why 12.31 crore shares were not confirmed, even though the shareholders had put in a bid for it. 

The non-confirmation of such a large number of bids makes us wonder what went wrong, and at which point everything went wrong. Did the shareholders not want the company to delist? Also, even if 90% of the shares were bid, wouldn’t the final discovered price be very high compared to the promoter’s floor price? Market regulator SEBI may initiate a probe into the matter, and let us wait and watch what the management decides to do next.

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Editorial

Tier-2 Lockdown Declared in London. Is it as Serious as it Sounds?

Why the Lockdown?

The number of coronavirus cases in the United Kingdom is showing a huge spike. As of October 15th, the country has recorded more than 6,57,000 cases of Covid-19, with 43,245 related deaths, as per official data compiled by John Hopkins University. The infection rates are increasing, with the number of cases doubling every 10 days.

Graph showing the rise in Covid-19 cases in the United Kingdom

In order to contain the spread of the virus, The UK Government has introduced ‘Local Covid Alert Levels’ in the country. There would be three levels- medium, high, and very high. Most parts of the country are under a medium alert of Tier-1. As of October 16th, the capital city of London will see a shift to the second-highest coronavirus risk tier. This would mean that millions of people in the city will be unable to meet anybody outside their household, whether at home or in public. Other areas such as Manchester, Nottingham, and Newcastle are some of the worst-hit areas. These cities could be upgraded to Tier-3 (highest alert level) at any given time.

What does it mean?

The rules and regulations under the Tier-2 lockdown are as follows:

  • Not more than 6 people will be allowed to gather outside
  • Schools, universities will remain open.
  • Indoor gatherings will not be permitted. As per the current rules, people are not allowed to meet anyone else other than family members.
  • Indoor sport and exercise classes can take place, but with not more than six people at a time.
  • Weddings or funerals can be attended by a maximum of 15-30 people.
  • People are advised to reduce the number of journeys, if possible. Walking or cycling has been encouraged.
  • Businesses can continue to operate, under Covid-secure conditions.

In case any of these rules are broken by citizens, the police will be able to take action and issue fines. If a person is organizing an illegal gathering, he or she could be fined up to £10,000 (~Rs 9.46 lakh). In his message to the people of London, the UK Health Secretary said: “Thank you for what you’ve done to suppress this virus once. We all need to play our part in getting the virus under control once again.”

What do we understand?

From what we can understand, these restrictions have caused a lot of panic and confusion amongst the people in London, as well as those in other cities. They have not been able to find a clear difference between the rules for Tier-2 and Tier-3 alerts. The rules do not seem to be strict, and have a lot of loopholes in them. In between all this confusion, it has been estimated that most small businesses would be hit, as the number of people visiting small shops or restaurants will further reduce. Also, businesses in Tier-2 regions will not be eligible for government support, as only those businesses in regions imposed with a Tier-3 alert can claim it. 

On October 15th, we saw that the global markets took a big hit, as these lockdown rules were announced. This was one of the major reasons why Indian markets fell that day. When European Markets opened with a huge gap-down, panic selling started in the already bearish Indian market. However, this sentiment seems to have been short-lived as global markets have recovered after knowing the lockdown is not that serious. 

But, do watch out if a shift to Tier-3 lockdown is announced in London. After the Covid crash, world markets have recovered partly because lockdown restrictions have lifted and economic activity has restarted. If nations are forced to re-introduce lockdowns, stock markets won’t be happy.

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Editorial Editorial of the Day

The infamously famous Satyam Scam – The Whole Story

Immediate rise after the Birth

Satyam Computer Services Limited was one of the biggest IT companies in India during the 2000s. It was started by Ramalinga Raju in 1987. Satyam used to offer various products and services related to software development, business intelligence and data warehousing, consulting and enterprise solutions. Rapidly, the organisation moved from being a domestic IT services company to a global IT firm.

The IT company got listed in the Bombay stock exchange in 1991. With the positive outlook of the firm and the industry atmosphere, the shares of the company were oversubscribed by 17 times. In 2001, Satyam Computers made a debut on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).

Two years before that, Satyam Infoway (Sify), the internet subsidiary of Satyam Computers got listed on the Nasdaq. The company and the promoters got numerous accolades for their achievements. In 2006, revenues of the company crossed $1 billion. Next year, Ramalinga Raju was named as the ‘Ernest and Youngest Entrepreneur of the Year’.

Interest in Real Estate

When you look at all the fraud stories in the world, none of the fraud which is conducted is done with an intention to get caught. Fraudsters always have a plan which they think can fool everyone. In the Satyam scam case, Ramalinga Raju had an amazing plan to outdo the whole system.

In the early 2000s, the real estate market was witnessing a boom. To earn more, Ramalinga Raju’s greed made him turn his attention to this market. Due to the industrial development happening in Hyderabad, prices of land was on a continuous rise. According to the estimates, the land prices were destined to rise exponentially within a few years.

Maytas infrastructures and Maytas properties were the companies which were owned by Ramalinga Raju and his family members. If you spell Satyam backwards, you will get Maytas! Raju aggressively started buying lands and properties in Hyderabad and other near places. To evade any doubts, the properties were brought on the names of Maytas infrastructures, Maytas properties and his other family members.

When he fell short of the money to buy lands, he started manipulating the financial statements of Satyam Computers. The total revenues and profits for the company in quarterly and annual reports were massively inflated. This gave a false image to the shareholders and other market participants that the company was doing exceptionally well. Rapid growth and strong financials lured the investors to buy Satyam’s shares in the market.

The Plan A

The fast increase in demand led to the Satyam’s share price shooting up. At these increased share prices, Ramalinga Raju and his brother started selling their shares to book higher capital appreciation. They also used their shares in Satyam as a collateral to get loans from the bank. The money came from these two routes were invested to buy more properties. He opened 365 companies on whose names he used to buy properties. It was also alleged that Raju had the map of the proposed metro route of Hyderabad. He used to buy lands near these metro routes so that he can sell the lands at higher prices in the coming years.

He planned to put some part of the money profited from the land back into Satyam’s financials. This would decrease the gap between the actual and fake figures of revenues and profits.

It was later disclosed that to show fake sales in the financial statements, Raju made 7,500 fake invoices. This helped him to back the fake figures of total revenues of the company. But as the revenue increases, profits and the cash reserves of the company should also increase, right? To cover up for fake profits, Raju made fake bank statements saying that the profits are kept in banks in the form of fixed deposits. In reality, these fixed deposits never existed!

This process continues for many years. All this while, the share price of the Satyam Computers kept on increasing. The promoters of the organisation were also happy to sell their shares at these higher prices. In 1999, promoter’s held 24% of the stake in the company. By 2008, this stake dropped to 5%!

The 2008 Recession

Future is unknown to everyone and it is highly uncertain. No one can plan anything perfectly.

Raju’s plan lost its plot due to the 2008 financial crisis. The global financial crisis of the US had an effect all around the globe. The real estate sector which was booming suddenly collapsed. There were no buyers and the sellers were forced to decrease their land prices. This recession crashed Raju’s dream to sell the property at higher prices and cover up the fake figures of Satyam Computers. But he didn’t stop there. He had another plan to cover up all the mess, without the world even getting a hint of it.

The Plan B

Ramalinga Raju knew that he has to cover up the fake financials which he has issued out for so many years. The plan B was that Satyam Computers will buy 100% and 51% stake of Maytas Infrastructure and Maytas Properties. This money which will be invested by Satyam Computers will go to Maytas’ promoters. And, who were Maytas promoters? Ramalinga Raju himself and his other family members. This deal would show that the difference in amount between the actual figures and fake figures is used to buy the two Maytas firms. But in reality, no cash transaction would take place. Another soundproof plan!

On 16th December 2008, the board directors of the company gave the green light to go through the two deals. Remember that promoters had only 5% stake left in the Satyam Computers? Thus, it was pivotal for Raju to get approval from institutional investors, who had a significant stake in the company, before making any acquisitions.

To Raju’s dismay, institutional investors were not in favour of this deal. When this news broke out, the share price of the company started falling quickly. One of the investors in the US even filed a lawsuit against Satyam Computers. The share prices of the company nose-dived at both Indian and the US exchange. Under the humongous pressure, the company was forced to cancel the acquisition of both the Maytas companies.

The Ultimate Confession and Aftermath

After seeing the failure of both of his plans, on 7th January 2009, he confessed about all his wrongdoings in front of the exchanges and SEBI. He disclosed the Rs 7,000-crore accounting fraud in the company’s financial statements about cash which never existed. Multiple government bodies were put to investigate everything about this scam. Several fingers were raised on the role of independent directors and Satyam’s auditors. Investors questioned how the auditors failed to do their job for so many years. PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) was Satyam’s auditor for all these years. It was later found that Satyam Computers were used to pay a lot more fees to PwC as compared to what other IT companies used to pay. 

After two days of confession, Ramalinga Raju and his brother were arrested. The same day, the Central Government disbanded Satyam board and appointed its own 10 directors. Satyam Computers had become a big brand by that time with a huge number of employees. To save the company from dying, the government sold the company’s majority of the stakes to Tech Mahindra. The entity was later called as Mahindra Satyam. Later, this entity got merged with Tech Mahindra. On 10th April 2015, Ramalinga Raju, his brother and few other accused were imprisoned for 7 years. 

That is all about the Satyam scandal. One simple learning opportunity for all the investors from this case is to always research on why the promoters of a company are selling their shares. 

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Editorial

TCS: Tata Group’s Cash Cow

TCS has become one of the top IT companies in the world. Even though we have heard of the company, most of us are not really aware of the services that they provide, or the scale at which they operate. It is important to know certain relevant details and facts of a company, before investing in it. Here are some things you need to know about TCS:

Company Profile

Tata Consultancy Services (TCS) was established in 1968 as a division of Tata Sons Limited. It is a management and technology consultant, which means that they provide services to other firms (or even government agencies), and help them transform the way technology is used. The services include application development, business processing outsourcing (BPO), payment processing, and much more. These could be used to improve business processes or reduce costs. One of the first contracts that TCS received was the development of a punch card system for TISCO (now Tata Steel). In 1989, they started expansion of their services internationally. During that period, they developed a depository and trading system called SECOM for SIS SegaInterSettle, a Swiss Company. They also created System X for the Canadian Depository System. These systems are what make trading in stock markets very easy and efficient.

With experience from these international contracts, TCS, in 1992 built the core trading platform for our very own National Stock Exchange (NSE). The company is responsible for completely changing the system by which capital markets worked in India. 

The rapid growth of the company was only possible through the leadership of its first CEO, F.C. Kohli. Often referred to as the Father of the Indian Software Industry, his vision for the company was very well-defined. He encouraged research and development initiatives, and laid the foundations for progressive changes in the industry. N. Chandrasekaran, who is currently the Chairman of the Board of Tata Sons, had a 30-year business career with TCS. Under his leadership, the company became India’s largest private-sector employer and the country’s most valuable company.

TCS became a publicly listed company on 25th August 2004. The company had the largest private-sector Initial Public Offering (IPO) in the Indian market during that time. It was priced at Rs 850 per share, and was oversubscribed 7.7 times. This means that the company had received more applications to purchase their shares, as compared to the number of shares that they had issued. 

Fast forward to 2013, TCS was at the 10th position in a league of top global IT service companies. The company had excelled in providing its expert services to banks, retail businesses, media companies, and much more. A great example of this could be the company’s collaboration with the Government, to set up 88 Passport Seva Kendras in 63 cities. In 2014, it became the first company in India to reach a market capitalization of Rs 5 lakh crore. Market capitalization is calculated by multiplying the total number of shares with the present share price. As of 8th October 2020, TCS has surpassed its rival company, Accenture, to become the most valuable IT company in the world, at Rs 10.6 trillion.

It is important that we understand another important feature of the company. TCS is known for how well it takes care of its employees. Their employee training and development programmes have been recognized as one of the best in the world. On 7th October, TCS announced a salary hike for all employees (it has over 4.54 lakh employees), effective from October 1. It has hired more than 16,000 in July-September, during a time when the world is seeing a huge increase in unemployment rates. 

Financial Performance

TCS contributes about 75% to the total profit of the Tata Group of companies. The Group always relies on TCS to provide support towards its loss-making firms such as Tata Motors and Tata Steel.

Over the last 10 years, its stock price has seen a Compounded Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of 20%. It is also a virtually debt-free company. It has about 72.04% promoter shareholding, as of September 2020. Over the last 5 years, revenue has grown at a yearly rate of 10.43%, whereas the IT industry average was at 9.83%.

TCS’s Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) is the highest amongst its competitors in the IT sector, at 47.8%. This means that for every Rs 100 worth of capital employed, TCS earns Rs 48 on it. The company has been maintaining a healthy dividend payout of 52.46%, which means that the company is giving out 52.46% of its profit as dividends to investors. They have shown consistent dividend payouts in the last 10 years.

As per its Q2 Results that have just come out, the revenue of the company saw a 4.73% growth from Rs 38,322 crore in the last quarter, to Rs 40,135 crore. This is a very huge result, as TCS has become the most profitable company in India, even more than Reliance.

The net profit has dropped 7.05% to Rs 7,475 crore year-on-year in the September quarter. The net profit was at Rs 8,042 crore during the same period last year. Profit has been impacted, as the company had set aside an amount of Rs 1,218 crore to pay for a lawsuit filed against them by Epic Systems in the US. Also, due to the Covid-19 pandemic, operating costs of almost all IT companies went up as the shift to work-from-home trend happened.

As these results came out on 7th October, TCS shares had a gain of 5.2% to hit an all-time high of Rs 2,877/share

According to the company, the recovery of Q1 results (problems faced due to Covid-19) was expected to happen in Q3, but it has already happened in Q2. This shows that the company has been able to address the core issues of global recession and increasing unemployment.

Infosys vs TCS

When we speak about the IT sector in India, we immediately think of Infosys and N.R. Narayana Murthy, its former CEO and Chairman. However, the question that arises here is- why doesn’t TCS come to our mind first?

Infosys Ltd. and TCS have together made India into an IT superpower. Since the IT sector exports its services, a lot of foreign currency flows into our country. Most of the revenue generated by both companies come from the USA and Europe. Even though we see that TCS is the biggest IT company in India, Infosys comes at a close second. In fact, a lot of reports had come up stating that the valuation of Infosys would soon catch up with that of TCS’.

During the last financial year, Infosys posted a better growth result as compared to TCS. However, whistleblower complaints against the executives of Infosys allowed TCS to widen the gap again. The business model, size, and higher margins of TCS has led to the company having better share prices.

Share Buyback announcement

On 7th October, TCS announced a share buyback of 5.33 lakh crore equity shares for an amount of Rs 16,000 crore. This is about 1.42% of the total paid-up capital. The price has been fixed at Rs 3,000 per share. The dividend at Rs 12/share will be payable on 3rd November. The company has stated that this announcement is in line with its long term goals. This will be the third buyback in TCS’s history.

Normally, when a company announces share buyback, it indicates that shares of the company are undervalued, or the company wants to distribute its cash to shareholders in a tax-efficient way. As we now know, undervaluation is not an issue at all for TCS. Some reports have come up, saying that this buyback could be aimed at pumping money back to its parent company, Tata Sons. The reports also state that promoters of Tata are in need of funds, as they want to invest more money into Tata Motors, and buy out SP Group’s stake in Tata Sons. You can read more about why the SP group wanted to sell off their stake in Tata Sons here.

As the flag-bearer of Tata Group, it is clear that Tata Consultancy Services have time and again exceeded their targets, and are continuing their path as a global leader in the IT industry. It is definitely interesting to understand how this Indian company has made a huge impact in all corners of the world.

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Editorial Editorial of the Day

Wipro : A True Long Term Candidate?

Wipro is a leading Indian multinational corporation that provides global information technology, consulting and business process services. The company was incorporated in 1945 as a manufacturer of vegetable and refined oils. In 1970-80, ‘Western India Palm Refined Oil Limited’ (now known as Wipro) shifted its focus towards the Indian IT industry. Under the leadership of Azim Premji, Wipro reached new heights, not only domestically but globally. Today, the company stands as the 4th largest IT company in India based on market capitalisation. 

Decoding Q2 FY21 results

Wipro announced their Q2 FY21 results just after the market hours on 13th October 2020. There was a sense of optimism in the market that the company is going to declare good numbers. And, this is what exactly happened! Wipro reported a decline of 3.4% YoY in net profits. At the same time, their net profits increased by 3.2% as compared to the previous quarter.

The revenues and net profits amassed for this quarter are Rs 15,114.50 crore and Rs 2,465.70 crore respectively. These numbers defeated a few market estimates and were on par with the others. Next day after the result, Wipro’s share price dropped by 7.06% to close at Rs 349.40. This could have happened as the investors look to book profits when the core reason for the rally is achieved. You must have heard the saying, “buy on rumours sell on news”. We believe this is what occurred today with Wipro in the market.

Due to fewer business projects during the pandemic, many big companies are laying off their employees. This leads to a negative sentiment among the market participants. Wipro has done exactly opposite to this! They have hired 12,000 employees including the onboarding of 3,000 employees in the second quarter itself. This speaks how the business of Wipro is expanding even in these testing times.

Operating revenue and profit tells how much a company is able to earn from their core business. If a company’s core business is not performing well, then it’s a red signal for the investors. Wipro’s operating profits have risen by 5.2% YoY and 4.4% QoQ. These are amazing numbers considering how the companies are trying to do business during the COVID-19 times.

Big News!

The major announcement which everyone was waiting for was of the share buyback. And yes! Wipro did officially declare a share buyback of 23.75 million equity share for Rs 400/ share. On 13th October 2020, Wipro closed at Rs 375.75. It means that promoters will buy the shares back at a premium of 6.45%. With this, Wipro became the second IT company to announce a share buyback after TCS in this quarter.

Why does share buyback have this hype? A company conducts a share buyback only when they believe that they are financially stable. This step shows the investors that the company is bullish about the company’s growth. They are willing to buy the shares at a higher price than the market price and are confident enough to take it even higher. Any company cannot be in a position to buy back shares until it has huge cash reserves. Wipro has registered an amazing 37.5% YoY rise in their operating cash flows. To know more about share buyback, click here.

The Price Uptrend

When the fear of coronavirus became real in March, Wipro’s share price faced a steep fall in the market. On 4th March, their share price was trading at Rs 229.70. On March 19, prices dropped to its 52-week low at Rs 162.35. Since then, Wipro’s share price has witnessed a constant rise. 

On 13th October, their share price was last traded at Rs 375.20. Two days back when the rumours of Wipro’s share buyback was heard in the market, their share price touched it’s all-time high at Rs 381.70. You can see the upward movement in the chart below.

(Wipro’s share price making new highs after collapsing from Covid crash)

In the past week itself, Wipro’s price has risen more than 12%! This shows how bullish people are with the stock. If you are following The Stock Market Show on Youtube, you would have realized how Nifty IT has been aiding Nifty 50 to rally upwards. Wipro has been one of the most important players to force that rally. As we mentioned above, post-result a significant fall in the share price was noticed. Yet, we believe that a company like Wipro which is fundamentally very strong will contribute immensely to the future of Indian IT industry.

Expectation in future

Wipro’s board is confident that the company will continue to climb the ladder in the coming future as well. They expect next quarter’s revenue from IT services to be between $2,022 million (Rs 14,815 crore) to $2,062 million (Rs 15,108 crore). That will cumulate to be a QoQ growth of 1.5%-3.5%. 

“I am very excited about the opportunities that are ahead of us and encouraged by the acceleration in business momentum we have seen this quarter. Our strategy is to focus on growth in prioritised sectors and markets led by vertical solution offerings.” – Thierry Delaporte, CEO of Wipro.

The company also announced the acquisition of engineering services company Eximius Design for Rs 586.3 crore. Eximius Design provides end-to-end solutions and services using modern technological tools like Artificial intelligence, Cloud, IoT etc. They are into Product Engineering services, Design & Development services, Maintenance & Value Engineering and System Validation & Test Automation.

This acquisition will help Wipro to expand into newer market segments and strengthen market leadership in VLSI (Very Large Scale Integration) and systems design services. They would be able to enhance their client’s experience of using new-age technologies. The IT sector is one of the very few sectors which is flourishing during these dismal times. Unlike other jobs, people working in IT companies are able to operate from home easily. This helps the companies to save their fixed cost and invest in technological expansion.

During the pandemic, local lockdowns are very frequent. Due to this, most of the non-IT company depends on the services offered by IT companies like Wipro. This is why the IT stocks are giving huge capital appreciation returns to the investors in the market right now. How long will this trend continue? Also don’t forget that in the 21st century, large cap companies can give you multibagger returns in the long run. You can read Wipro’s press release here.

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Editorial

The Barings Bank and the Rogue Trader

How many times have you heard that a single employee of the bank has caused the whole bank to shut down? How many times have you heard that a single employee was the reason behind the collapse of a 200-year old bank? I am sure, not very often. Today, we bring one such story which amazed the whole financial sector and led everyone to do some deep thinking.

About Barings Bank

Barings Bank was a British merchant bank in London which collapsed in 1995. The bank was the second oldest merchant bank (modern banks) which was founded in 1762. It went on to become one of the largest and safest banks in the world. It was a very reputed bank and it even offered personal banking services to Queen Elizabeth. Barings Bank was also popular as it was financing the Napoleonic Wars, Louisiana Purchase by the US and the Erie Canal. 

In February of 1995, Nick Leeson single-handedly led the bank to bankruptcy. But how did a single man became so significant that it left no option for Barings Bank but to shut down? 

The best trader in town

Nick Leeson, the former employee of Morgan Stanley, joined Barings Bank at the age of 28. He was transferred to Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, and was able to settle £100 million worth of back-office contracts. He performed better than expected as he rectified all problems faced by them in just 10 months. This impressed the bank’s senior management.

They promoted Leeson to the post of general manager of Barings Securities in Singapore. He was sent to head both front-office and back-office operations. He was also responsible for hiring new staff, including a team of traders which will help him during the market hours.

Nick Leeson was Baring’s face on the trading floor. He was the person who made all the decisions regarding the trading of the bank’s money in the derivatives market of SIMEX (Singapore International Monetary Exchange). He made unauthorized speculative trades which helped the bank to earn huge profits on a consistent basis. At the end of 1992, more than 10% of the bank’s profits came because of Nick Leeson’s wondrous trading moves. Normally, the contribution of investments in a company’s profit is nowhere near 10%. This earned him unlimited trust from his London bosses. But, they were not aware of the implications their decision will have.

The Collapse

Nick Leeson’s good luck in trading didn’t last wrong and soon he started losing money. To hid his incompetency from the management, he created an ‘88888’ account. He hid his losses in this account. In front of the senior managers, Leeson mentioned that these losses were of one of the inexperienced junior traders. Till 1993, the losses in this secret account were around £23 million. But by the end of 1994, the amount had increased exponentially to £208 million. For context, £1 is almost ₹100 today. That means this amount would have been close to ₹2,000 crores.

On January 16, 1995, Leeson used a short straddle strategy at Singapore and Tokyo stock exchanges. He was sure that the market would not have any significant movement, neither upwards nor downwards. But, he didn’t know what would happen next.

On January 17, 1995, a big earthquake, registering magnitude 7.2 on the Richter scale hit Japan. This caused a sharp drop in the Asian markets, specifically Tokyo stock exchanges where the Nikkei dropped 1000 points. To cover for his losses, Leeson made more risky trades hoping that the market will lift again. He purchased even more Nikkei futures contracts in hopes that he will be able to drive the market upside alone. But to his dismay, the market fell continuously. 

Failed and Fooled 

One question which comes in mind after reading this is, where was the audit committee? Why was there no checks when the single account was recording such huge losses? The review committee ‘failed’ in their checks and were successfully ‘fooled‘ by Nick Leeson. There were multiple factors which played in Leeson’s favour. As he operated in both the front-office and back-office, he had unlimited autonomy. 

He was making trades through front-office and was in command of the back-office which had the role to keep checks on the trades made by the front-office. Thus, he was making highly risky trades and was approving himself without any restrictions. That means, he had the ability to hide whatever he wanted to hide from the official books. Leeson made false declarations to regulatory authorities to avoid any strict checks on his work. He hid huge amounts of losses and forged the signatures of his seniors to get access to more money.

The Shutdown and Aftermath

By the time Barings Bank investigated and discovered the ‘88888’ account, the losses were too big for the company to stay afloat. Nick Leeson was accountable for the losses worth £827 million. This was twice the Barings Bank available trading capital. With no way out to recoup the losses he has incurred, Leeson decided to flee away. He left a note which read “I’m sorry”.

On February 26, 1995, the 233-year-old Barings Banks bank was declared insolvent. After 10 days, on 6th March 1995, it was officially acquired by a Dutch investment group, ING. They paid a meagre amount of £1 for this acquisition, just imagine buying a bank for ₹100! The collapse caused 1,200 people to lose their jobs in Singapore alone. In 2001, ING Barings was sold to ABN Amro. 

After flying away to Malaysia and Thailand, Nick Leeson was arrested in Frankfurt, Germany. He was brought back to Singapore after 9 months and was sentenced to a jail term of 6.5 years. Leeson was charged on two grounds: deceiving the bank’s auditors and cheating the Singapore exchange. He served his term in jail during which he was diagnosed with colon cancer. 

After being released from his prison, Nick Leeson has started a new life. He is now a public speaker and lecturer. He is also a personal trader and gives out regular comments on market performance.

Categories
Editorial

The Harshad Mehta Scam of 1992.

Harshad Mehta, the Big Bull, the man who changed the face of the Indian share market, is also known for committing one of the largest financial scams in Indian History exposed by Journalist Sucheta Dalal in her Times of India article. The amount of the scam was close to Rs 4,500 crores.

Harshad Mehta (Source: TheQuint)

Mehta was born on 29 July 1954 in Paneli Moti in Rajkot, Gujarat. He spent a part of his childhood in Mumbai till his family moved to Raipur, Chhattisgarh. He returned to Mumbai where he studied B.Com at Lajpat Rai College. Mehta went on to do many odd jobs till he joined New India Assurance Company Limited(NIACL) as an insurance sales executive in Fort, Mumbai. The Bombay Stock Exchange building or Phiroze Jeejeebhoy Towers was just minutes away from his workplace and which he would often visit in his free time, only to be awestruck by the way things worked at the exchange. It was during this period that Mehta developed a keen interest in the stock market.

Mehta then joined Harjivandas Nemidas Securities as a Jobber/Broker for Prasann Pranjivandas who Mehta considered as his ‘Guru’. Mehta worked his way to the top in the profession. He went on in starting his own firm called GrowMore Research and Asset Management Ltd. in 1987. His influence on the Dalal streets earned him a name. Media houses referred to him as ‘The Raging Bull’, ‘The Big Bull’ and ‘Amitabh Bachchan of Stock Market’

The Big Bull

Mehta was a master manipulator, his influence on the market and contacts with other participants helped him rig the prices of shares. He adopted a practice in the market called “Pump and Dump”, where he would manipulate the market. Mehta would use huge sums of money to buy a particular share from the market. This would naturally increase the demand for the share and create buying pressure in the market. Then, Mehta, through his jobbers and brokers, would spread a word of mouth in the market, and people eventually started speculating the market based on Mehta’s tips. When retailers enter the stock, the prices would again jump up. Once the stock would touch the ceiling, Mehta would start selling his shares and booking huge amounts of profit. This was a common practice back in the day since SEBI didn’t have any statutory powers and the market remained unregulated. In fact, SEBI was established only on 12 April 1988 and given powers to take action almost 4 years later on 30 January 1992.

The market would essentially be controlled by brokers, especially the powerful ones. They would group together and drive market prices up and down. The ones who benefitted from rising share prices were called the ‘Bull Cartel’ and the ones who benefitted from a fall in share prices and short selling were called the ‘Bear Cartel’. The Bull Cartel like Mehta drove the share prices up, whereas the Bear Cartel drove the share prices down.

Mehta’s reputation on the market earned him celebrity status. Mehta’s stock tips were most sought after, speculators blindly invested in stocks suggested by Mehta. At the time, it was believed that Mehta’s touch turned any company’s stock into gold. As an example, he took the price of ACC or Association of Cement Companies stock from Rs 200 to Rs 9000 (a 4,400% increase) in a very short span of time. Such a sharp increase in prices was noticed in many other companies’ stocks.

Between 1991 and 1992, the value of SENSEX, the benchmark index of the Bombay Stock Exchange, increased by FOUR TIMES(from 1250 points to 4460 points) in just one year’s time. Such a phenomenon had never occurred before.

Mehta’s activities were noticed by market watchers with a suspicious eye. To kill their suspicion and justify his action on the market, he propagated a theory called the ‘Replacement Cost Theory’. Mehta justified his actions by stating that the value of a company shouldn’t be based on its current earnings, but rather on what it would cost to replace the company with a new one, if it didn’t exist. This was essentially a sham theory to kill the suspicion in the market.

Mehta and his media hype added brand value to the profession of stockbroking and investing, market volumes were up like never before. He would flaunt his 12,000 Sq. Ft. home in the poshest areas of Mumbai with a private golf course and moved around in the most luxurious cars in town. Such wealth and lifestyle weren’t previously associated with the stock market. What took the Ambanis decades of struggle to gain popularity with the press, the government, and regulators to earn a presence in the market, Harshad Mehta gained it in a matter of few years. Something seemed fishy and Journalist Sucheta Dalal had caught the air of it.

The Scam

  • The scam happened around the time when India had begun opening up its economy. The LPG (Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization) Policy of 1991 opened up many opportunities in terms of business and innovation The policy brought its own set of loopholes in the financial markets of the country.
  • In the ’90s, banks were not allowed to invest in the share market. In order to fulfill their monetary requirement, they would either borrow from the Reserve Bank of India(RBI) or from other banks in a Ready Forward Deal(RFD). This happened through government securities or government bonds(G-Sec).
  • In a Ready Forward Deal(RFD), the lender bank would lend money and take government bonds from the borrower bank for a maximum of 15 Days. The lender bank would get the money back, with interest. However, banks did not know which bank to approach in case they wanted to lend or borrow. So the transaction between banks happened through ‘brokers’ who had knowledge and contacts in the market. In this case, Harshad Mehta acted as a broker.
  • Mehta had really great contacts in the banking system and money markets. The trade was so secretive that banks wouldn’t know which other banks they were dealing with. Mehta used this to his advantage. All cheques were issued in his name and not in the name of the concerned bank
  • The RBI’s Public Debt Office (PDO) maintained a handwritten record of all government bond transactions in what is known as SGL or subsidiary general ledger. The bank which would borrow money would provide the lending bank with an SGL Form. After some time, the borrower bank would pay back the amount with interest and collect its SGL Form back. The SGL forms were backed by securities.
  • The SGL was difficult to maintain as it had to be done manually. There would be many human errors that would creep in and that made SGL Form transfer inefficient. Soon Bank Receipts or BRs were introduced to replace them.
  • Bank Receipts or BRs were given to the ‘Lending Bank’ to acknowledge their payment and that the money will be paid back with the interest decided. These Bank Receipts (BR) were NOT backed by any securities and DID NOT have a centralized ledger.
  • HERE COMES THE SCAM: Mehta tied up with officials at Bank of Karad and Metropolitan Cooperative Bank and printed fake Bank Receipts. Mehta would go to the ‘Lending Bank’ and get the money from them in exchange for these Fake Bank Receipts. He would then invest this money to rig the stock market.
  • What about the ‘Borrower Bank’? How would Mehta give them the borrowed money? Mehta would borrow money from a ‘third bank’ for these fake Bank Receipts just as he did with the previous bank and then pay the ‘Borrower Bank’.
  • Mehta was in touch with many such banks and actually had everyone, right from the clerks to the top-level management in his pockets. He had bribed many officials
  • Mehta would, directly and indirectly, buy certain stocks in bulk which would then have skyrocketing prices. This would put people in the perception that whichever stock Mehta chose would turn into gold. Eventually, more people would invest in these stocks, which would further drive up prices.
  • When the prices would reach their peak, Mehta and his associates would book ENORMOUS profits!
  • The magnitude of money involved was tremendous. Almost ~Rs.4500 crores is said to have been displaced in this scam. This scam couldn’t have been done alone by Mehta.

Exposed!

  • On April 23, 1992, Journalist Sucheta Dalal in The Times of India reports that the State Bank of India has asked The Big Bull to square up Rs 500 crores of irregularities. This caused mayhem in the country, and the SENSEX crashed. There was chaos in the parliament as well.
  • The National Housing Bank, wholly-owned by RBI, was accused of transferring money to Harshad Mehta for him to cover up the displaced amount. The chairman resigned shortly.
  • The scam involved officials from SBI, Brokerage Firms, Bureaucrats, Politicians, directors, and small-time employees of banks. There was extensive bribery to run the scheme of affairs. Many were arrested and asked to resign, offices were raided, several assets belonging to businessmen were attached. The country was shaken.
  • Standard Chartered, ANZ Grinlays, Bank of America, Andhra Bank, UCO Bank, and many more such banks were involved.
  • The CBI, RBI, SEBI, Income Tax Department, State Police. Almost every possible machinery was involved in the investigation.
  • P. Chidambaram, who was in the cabinet resigned. His wife owned 25,000 shares in Fairgrowth Financial Services, which was a part of the scandal.
  • Finance Minister Manmohan Singh was asked to resign, which was however not accepted by the then Prime Minister PV Narasimha Rao.
  • The Jankiraman Committee and a Joint Parliamentary Committee were set up to investigate the claims involved in the scam.
  • Mehta claimed that he had bribed the then-PM PV Narsimha Rao almost Rs. 1 crore for clearing him of charges. His claims were refuted by the authorities.
Mehta presenting the suitcase in which he claims to have given the bribe amount to then PM PV Narsimha Rao (Source: Associated Press)
  • Mehta and his family members were banned for life from trading on any exchange in India.
  • Harshad Mehta was charged with 72 criminal offenses with more than 600 criminal action suits. He was arrested and later released on bail. However, In September 1999, Mehta was sentenced to 5 years imprisonment a laughable Rs 25,000 fine. Mehta died in prison on 31 December 2001 from a heart attack as reported by the media.

Aftermath

  • Mehta had made use of loopholes in the market to commit fraud. An attempt was made by regulatory authorities to correct these frauds.
  • SEBI or Securities and Exchange Bureau was given statutory powers and could now regulate the market.
  • SEBI banned short selling until the ban was lifted in 2006. Insider Trading was made illegal.
  • The sale of shares done through tainted brokers or brokers involved in the scandal was banned. The common man was affected by this since most were unaware of what was happening, these shares were called tainted shares. The sale of such shares was permitted later.
  • The Bank of Karad and Metropolitan Cooperative Bank which made the fake Bank Receipts were liquidated and closed, since their liabilities were much more than their assets.
  • The Narasimham Committee was formed to tighten loopholes and bring reforms to the system after the 1992 scandal.

The Income Tax department claimed that Mehta’s GrowMore Research and Asset Management Ltd. owed more than Rs 11,000 crores in taxes which Mehta’s lawyer refuted stating that Mehta’s lifetime earnings were less than Rs 3,000 crores at the time. Over 27 years, in the appeals filed by his wife and family, the IT department deleted over Rs 2,000 crores of taxes that were in his name and even gave tax refunds.

Just like Mehta, Big Banks were also misusing the same loopholes, however, Media attention, regulatory authorities, and the cases were primarily driven only against Mehta.

Could this have been an attempt by the Big Bosses to distract the public and media attention away from them? Was Harshad Mehta being made a scapegoat as claimed by him? There are a lot of questions left unanswered following his death. A detailed log of events that happened in the Harshad Mehta Scandal and the Ketan Parekh Scandal have been given in the book ‘The Scam: Who Won, Who Lost, Who Got Away’ by Sucheta Dalal and Debashish Basu. You can buy it here.

Mehta has been back in the news with the launch of the 10 Part web series ‘Scam 1992’, based on the book by Sucheta Dalal and Debashish Basu. The series portrays all the incidents surrounding Harshad Mehta, from the day he lay his first step into the Bombay Stock Exchange, right to the day he took his last breath at Thane Prison. The series is both informative, intriguing and is a must-watch even if one is a beginner in the world of finance. You can watch the trailer for ‘Scam 1992’ here, or the entire series on SonyLIV here.

Categories
Editorial

Mayhem at Lakshmi Vilas Bank

Lakshmi Vilas Bank (LVB) has been in headlines lately. The shareholders in the Annual General Meeting ousted 7 of their senior management including CEO and MD S. Sundar. The shareholder even voted against the re-appointment of its statutory auditors. Yes, even the auditors! Previously, Lakshmi Vilas Bank had been facing a series of resignations from top officials, failed investment prospectives, rising Bad Debt, and poor financial performance. Is Lakshmi Vilas Bank headed for real trouble now? Or can Lakshmi Vilas Bank get out of this mess, like Yes Bank?

Poor Financials

  • LVB has been posting a loss for the last 10 quarters. Subsequently, the loss for the quarter ending June stood at a whopping Rs 112.3 crores.
  • The company’s Gross Non-Performing Assets (NPA) has risen from 10.7% in June 2018 to a very high of 25.4% in June 2019. Gross NPA is the sum of all loans given out by the bank, which have not been paid back duly or, in simple terms, sum of all loans that have gone bad. Having a 25.4% Gross NPA means that 25.4% of all the loans the bank has given have gone bad.
  • The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) had placed the bank on PCA(Prompt Corrective Action) framework in September 2019, citing rising debts and inadequate capital. Under PCA, a bank’s lending is restricted, the bank is required to arrange a certain capital and meet certain conditions placed by the RBI.
  • The Capital Adequacy Ratio(CAR) of the bank as of June 2020 stands at 0.17% as opposed to the minimum 9% limit set by the RBI. CAR is the amount of capital a bank retains as compared to its risks. It tells us whether to not the company will be able to absorb losses in wake of an uncertain event. Essentially it tells us about the financial health of the company, and in the case of Lakshmi Vilas Bank, it is not looking good.

Too Many Resignations? Internal Conflict? Poor Management?

  • There is a noticeable pattern in voting out of the senior officials in the AGM. In the ousting of the senior officials, 80% of the promoter group was IN FAVOR of retaining them, while only 20% were AGAINST retaining them. It was because of the vote of the retail and institutional shareholders that they were ousted from the bank. This could be because of internal politics in the board of the bank.
  • The company’s then-CEO and MD Parthasarathi Mukherjee resigned in August 2019. In September 2019, the company was placed under Prompt Corrective Action by the RBI. This was around the time LVB and Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited were planning a merger which was struck down by the RBI in October 2019.
  • The Then-CFO S.Sundar along with three senior officials had resigned due to ‘administrative reasons’. The next day, he was appointed as interim CEO and MD. In September 2017, he was ousted along with 6 other officials in the Annual General Meeting.
  • Vice President and Chief Risk Officer D Krishnakumar resigned in April 2020. The reason for his resignation was not stated.
  • In 2019, Religare Finvest, a financial services company accused LVB and two of its promoters of siphoning off funds up to Rs 793 crores. Economic Offences Wing of the Delhi Police arrested two of its ex-employees in connection with the case. LVB denied all claims and stated that RFL made the accusation to cover-up their own instance of fraud.

Recent Developments

The point is, LVB is having a capital crunch. The shareholders voted in favor of raising the foreign shareholding limit to 74 percent and also voted in favor of a rights issue to meet capital needs. The RBI has also set up a 3-Member Committee to look after the functioning of the bank temporarily.

LVB is in talks with Clix Capital, a Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC), for a merger. Both have signed informal agreements for the merger and also completed the due diligence for the same. The merger may bring up capital of up to Rs 1,900 crores and assets worth Rs 4,600 crores from Clix Capital. There is still an uncertainty after the board room scuffle during the AGM. RBI wants this deal to go ahead as soon as possible. If the deal doesn’t click, the RBI may push for a merger with a larger bank.

Clix Capital has given a non-binding offer letter to LVB, offering to take close to 90% stake in LVB. Clix Capital has also sought an exemption from the mandatory three-year lock in period for sale of shares. This gives a hint about the deal going through.

There is definitely some internal problems within the senior management. However, the depositor’s money is safe, but only to a point. The liquidity coverage ratio of the bank is 262% against the RBI norm of 100%, this means it can easily meet its short term obligations easily. Investors and Bank Account holders need to watch out how LVB raises capital, gets a new, faster, and more efficient CEO, and steps taken by the bank to reduce NPAs and allot capital efficiently.